based on ambiguous financial criteria and without any consideration of scientific merit, with many of the remainder placed in a financially suspect category.
The conclusions to be drawn are obvious: In general, grants are best awarded solely on the basis of scientific peer review, and funded in full without matches, strings, or contingencies that depend on outside agents. By eschewing scientific excellence as the primary consideration, co-funded programs imperil scientific credibility and fail to engage the breadth and depth of national scientific expertise. We encourage governments, scientific administrators, and scientists in Canada and other countries not to succumb to the superficial allure of co-funding but rather to evaluate and fully fund research on its own merits. The manifold benefits to society will inevitably follow, as was long the case before the advent of co-funding programs.
Issues in Biosecurity and Biosafety
A 2004 REPORT, BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH in an Age of Terrorism, recommended that Institutional Biosafety Committees (IBCs) review research for biosecurity and "dual use" potential, to prevent nefarious applications such as bioterrorism or biowarfare (1).
To discuss this recommendation, we convened a group of IBC chairs, scientists, and administrative staff from our six universities on 11 May (2). We hope that the fruits of our deliberation will be considered by the National Scientific Advisory Board on Biosecurity (NSABB), which will meet for the first time on 30 June. NSABB's first task is to formulate criteria for "dual use," starting from the seven "experiments of concern" in the 2004 report. Yet the much deeper problem is what to do once concerns are identified. There appears to be little consensus.
Some believe that secrecy is the best policy to stop proliferation. Others believe open science is the best long-term policy; misuse is a risk, but secrecy hinders advances toward drugs, vaccines, and detection methods. There is some agreement between these frameworks, however: Most agree that security measures and the location of dangerous materials should remain secret and that most research results should be published. But experiments reconstituting synthetic polio and the Australian experience with interleukin-4 in mousepox (3, 4) Adding review of biosecurity (preventing proliferation of bioweapons) to the existing biosafety (mitigating biohazard) mandate for IBCs is a big change. IBCs have gotten little attention and few resources over the past two decades. A 2003 survey found only 21% of IBCs reported that their members had training in biosafety review; 64% had less than one full-time equivalent staff member (6). Last year's "Sunshine Project" report on IBCs, although strident and sarcastic, further documented this dearth of attention (7). We are concerned that IBCs today might face a situation similar to resource-starved Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) in the late 1990s. IRBs received attention only after human research was conspicuously shut down at major research institutions.
NIH recently gave welcome guidance to IBCs (8). The big new task of biosecurity review is nonetheless fraught with ambiguity. Federal guidance to IBCs now comes from NIH's Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC), focused on biosafety; NSABB will address biosecurity. Sorting out the respective roles of IBCs, RAC, and NSABB will clearly be a challenge. NSABB will not review individual protocols; instead, it will respond to requests for guidance. Protocol review will thus be left to IBCs, at least initially. Are institutions prepared to shoulder this burden?
The stakes are high: Biodefense is a prominent and hotly contested field that has grown immensely in the past 3 years. It is tugged in many different directions, as previous correspondence in these pages testifies (9) (10) (11) . Biosecurity review is yet another battleground. IBCs will need resources, training, and guidance to ensure that resources devoted to research on biodefense and emerging infections are used effectively, and that public trust and accountability are preserved.
Problems in Patenting
Human Genes • A weekly electronic journal
• Information management tools
• A lab manual to help you organize your research
• An interactive database of signaling pathways this has occurred, most recently with respect to the claims covering methods to inhibit Cox-2, although there is no universal agreement on the merits in this case (1) . That said, the quantitative conclusions drawn by the authors are open to question. Their apparent criteria for concluding that claims are "problematic" themselves appear problematic. For example, the authors complain that applicants take advantage of the redundancy of the genetic code by "claiming the sequence of a protein within a patent and then also asserting rights over all the DNA sequence variants that encode for that protein." This is standard and recognized practice, since the various encoding nucleotide sequences are directly deducible from the protein sequence. The Federal Circuit itself has recognized this recently (2) .
I n s t i t u t i o n a l S i t e L i c e n s e A v a i l a b l e
More confidence might be had in the conclusions drawn by this article were the criteria for its conclusions more closely aligned with the interpretations of the statutory requirements as interpreted by the courts and as generally recognized in the practice. an analysis of scope and claims," Policy Forum, 11 Mar., p. 1566) offers the reader little confidence for the conclusions drawn, as it opens with two errors. With gene patents, the invention is the chemical compound, not "the information," as the authors purport. This misstatement is followed by another when they say, "Consequently, disclosure of that information does not allow others to build on it." Others can build on the patented compound, as they can with other patented chemical inventions. A study that only considers the issued patent for context will miss the salient points upon which the examiner relied in issuing the patent. Additionally, Paradise et al. do not cite specific patents, so it is impossible to determine if the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) complied with all appropriate statutes, rules, or guidelines in the handling of particular patent applications. However, any study about a patent's validity would be incomplete if it did not review the file history associated with the patent.
KATE H. MURASHIGE
The study used patents issued before 1999 (1). Since 1999, the USPTO has provided examiners with revised guidelines to ensure compliance with the utility (2) and written description (3) requirements of the law.
At the USPTO, we work hard to ensure the public's interest is considered and protected. The Office can only fulfill its obligation to serve the public interest if patent applicants fulfill their obligation to inform the USPTO of all information material to patentability (4) . Patents are the result of a mutual, shared responsibility. The USPTO is the executive branch's policy lead on recommendations on matters of intellectual property. As such, I welcome the input of the scientific community on the direction and goals of the Office.
Response OUR STUDY DID PRECISELY WHAT MURASHIGE
is calling for. We applied the statutory requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 100 et. al. to gene patents. This contrasts with what practicing attorneys routinely do, which is to claim aggressively for their clients, even though some claims might later be invalidated in litigation.
Rolla assumes that we have overestimated utility problems by including patents granted before the USPTO in 1999 issued new utility guidelines. However, because we limited our analysis to gene patents related to specific diseases, the patents we analyzed were not of the offensive expressed sequence tag variety, which the guidelines addressed. The pre-1999 patents we analyzed had a potential use in diagnosing diseases, and the policy change did not affect their patentability.
Rolla criticizes us for not analyzing the file history of the patents we examined. The Federal Circuit, however, has noted that an analysis of the specification [the portion of the patent where the invention is described (1)], and not the file history, is usually "dispositive" of any claim construction issues (2) . That is what the investigators meticulously did in this study. The file history is not relevant in assessing the adequacy of the patent's disclosure and the utility of the invention.
The juxtaposition of Rolla's claim that "the invention is the chemical compound, not 'the information'" and Murashige's "recognized practice" of using a protein sequence to claim exclusive rights to undis-L ETTERS covered, hypothesized DNA sequences, underscores our point that inventions in this area relate to data, not compounds. Moreover, traditional composition of matter patents cover a chemical composition with a particular function, such as a drug, which can be designed around. A genetic sequence-the alphabet of ATCGs-is strictly information that has no function until it is linked to an intervention such as a method of diagnosis. Yet allowing a patent on that information allows the holder to prevent others from using the basic sequence, even in research (3), and one cannot design around a human nucleotide sequence if one wants to study, diagnose, or treat the genetic disease at issue.
Murashige cites In re Wallach (4), where the court said in dicta, which is not binding precedent, that it "may" (not necessarily, would) in a future case find that knowing the protein sequence alone would allow the patent applicant to claim all DNA sequences coding for that protein. Such a comment conflicts with the holding in In re Deuel that knowledge of a protein sequence does not necessarily put the inventor in possession of the DNA sequence, because of the redundancy of the genetic code (5).
We were careful to state that our findings represent our team's application of the statutory guidelines and do not necessarily predict what a court would do. In the United States, unlike in Europe, there is no formal mechanism for third-party intervention in the decision to grant a patent, so studies such as ours may be the only way for the larger community to weigh in on the legal appropriateness of gene patent claims. 
